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1. Introduction
n January 1997, the U.S. Treasury began issuing 
 Treasury inflation-indexed securities (TIIS)—debt 
securities with coupon and principal payments that adjust in 
line with a measure of consumer prices. Through 2003, the 
Treasury had issued $172 billion of these securities, with 
maturity dates ranging from 2002 to 2032. By the end of 2003, 
the amount of TIIS outstanding (including inflation accrual) 
totaled approximately $176 billion, or nearly 7 percent of all 
outstanding Treasury notes and bonds.
Inflation-indexed debt held the promise of providing 
benefits to both investors and the Treasury. Investors could 
benefit, it was argued, from access to a new type of asset that 
reduces the risks associated with inflation. By purchasing 
inflation-indexed securities, they could lock in a real rate of 
return—measured in terms of the amounts of goods and 
services that can be purchased—over the maturity of the 
security, thereby protecting themselves against the possibility 
that an unexpected rise in inflation would erode the real return 
on a nominal debt security.1 Moreover, the Treasury’s 
willingness to issue TIIS could provide a benchmark that would 
spur private issuance of inflation-indexed securities.
The Treasury would also benefit, some argued, because the 
issuance of inflation-indexed debt would likely reduce its 
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• Treasury inflation-indexed securities (TIIS) have 
yet to live up to one of their primary goals: 
reducing the U.S. Treasury’s expected 
financing costs.
• Since 1997, yields on TIIS have been 
surprisingly high relative to yields on 
comparable nominal Treasury securities, with 
the spread between yields falling, on average, 
well below survey measures of long-run 
inflation expectations. 
• This study attributes this “valuation puzzle” to 
several factors: investor difficulty adjusting to 
a new asset class, divergent supply trends 
between TIIS and nominal Treasuries, and the 
lower liquidity of TIIS. In addition, investors may 
have had a benign outlook for inflation and 
inflation risks. 
• More recently, the liquidity and breadth of 
investor participation in the TIIS market have 
increased notably, and the valuation of these 
securities appears to have improved.
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financing costs. The rationale was that investors typically 
demand a higher return on nominal debt securities to 
compensate for the risks associated with future inflation. By 
issuing inflation-indexed debt, the Treasury would eliminate 
that risk for investors and therefore avoid having to pay this 
“inflation risk premium,” which would also lower its financing 
costs.2
In addition, some argued that issuing indexed debt would 
offer ancillary benefits by providing policymakers and market 
participants with a useful reading of real interest rates. In that 
case, comparing the yields on TIIS with those on nominal 
securities would provide a measure of the amount of 
compensation that investors demand to offset future inflation 
and the associated risks—a potentially useful gauge for 
monetary policymakers.
This article describes the U.S. experience with inflation-
indexed debt, including the evolution of activity in the TIIS 
market since its inception and the valuation of those securities 
relative to nominal Treasury issues. We show that despite the 
potential appeal of TIIS, their yields have been surprisingly 
high relative to those on comparable nominal Treasury 
securities. Indeed, the spread between ten-year yields on 
nominal securities and TIIS has, on average, fallen about 
50 basis points below the long-run inflation expectations 
reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters, conducted 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We analyze several 
explanations for this “valuation puzzle” as well as offer 
evidence that bears on those explanations.
One possibility is that the low relative valuation of TIIS has 
reflected investor difficulty adjusting to a new asset class. Over 
much of the period examined, participation in the TIIS market 
has been quite limited, although the investor base appears to 
have broadened considerably in recent years. 
A second possibility is that divergent trends in supply 
affected the relative values of TIIS and nominal Treasury 
securities over this period. The market had to digest fairly rapid 
growth in the supply of TIIS at a time when investor 
participation was subdued, which may have put upward 
pressure on the yields of those securities. The robust expansion 
in outstanding TIIS contrasted with substantial declines in the 
supply of nominal Treasury notes and bonds from 1997 to early 
2002.
A third possibility is that the low relative valuation of TIIS 
has reflected the lower liquidity of those securities. TIIS 
liquidity was particularly poor during the first several years of 
the securities’ existence. Liquidity has improved in recent years 
as participation in the market has expanded, but TIIS will likely 
never achieve the same liquidity as nominal Treasury debt, 
largely because of the different roles that the two types of 
securities play in financial markets. As we discuss, TIIS are held 
primarily by “end users,” or investors that tend to buy and hold 
the instruments. By contrast, nominal Treasury securities, 
especially recently issued ones, are to a large extent used as 
hedging and trading instruments, with primary dealers playing 
a very active role in the market.3
Factors such as the difficulty of launching a new asset class, 
supply trends, and the lower liquidity of indexed debt clearly 
have weighed on the valuation of TIIS over parts of our study 
period. However, even after adjusting for the influence of these 
factors, we argue that the observed valuation of TIIS relative to 
nominal Treasury securities suggests that investors simply had 
a very benign outlook for inflation over this period and did not 
demand much, if any, of an inflation risk premium for holding 
nominal securities.
Because of the low valuation of TIIS relative to nominal 
securities, inflation-indexed debt has not yet lived up to its 
purpose of reducing financing costs for the Treasury.4 Our 
results suggest that based on inflation through mid-2003, the 
TIIS program has cost the Treasury nearly $3 billion more than 
the issuance of comparable nominal securities. Moreover, we 
find that future consumer price index (CPI) inflation would 
have to come in at about 1.7 percent for the Treasury to break 
even on the outstanding TIIS securities. According to the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters, long-run inflation is 
expected to be about 2.5 percent. If that forecast proves 
accurate, the Treasury would pay roughly 80 basis points of 
additional financing costs on the outstanding TIIS relative to 
comparable nominal securities.
Nevertheless, the TIIS market seems to be evolving. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that investor participation in the 
market has widened considerably in recent years and that the 
liquidity of TIIS has increased noticeably. Moreover, these 
developments appear to have coincided with some improve-
ment in the relative valuation of TIIS, although the evidence is 
still quite tentative to date.
Despite the potential appeal of TIIS 
[Treasury inflation-indexed securities], 
their yields have been surprisingly high 
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2. The Mechanics of TIIS
Treasury inflation-indexed securities differ from nominal debt 
securities in the sense that payments on the TIIS adjust over 
time based on the rate of CPI inflation. More specifically, the 
principal amount of the TIIS increases daily by an amount 
determined by the increase in the CPI measure between the 
third and second preceding months—the minimum 
indexation lag possible given the timing of the CPI data release. 
Coupon payments on TIIS are determined as a fixed 
percentage of the indexed principal amount and therefore also 
increase in line with the CPI. Because of indexation, the 
principal and coupon payments on the TIIS are fixed in real 
terms—that is, on an inflation-adjusted basis. As a result, the 
quoted yield on a TIIS is approximately the real rate of return 
that an investor would earn by holding the security to 
maturity.5
The spread between the yield on a TIIS and that on a 
comparable nominal security—often called the rate of inflation 
compensation—is influenced by investors’ views about future 
inflation. (See the appendix for a more formal discussion of the 
pricing of TIIS relative to nominal securities.) If investors were 
risk-neutral, the rate of inflation compensation would 
(approximately) equal the annualized cumulative rate of 
inflation that investors expect over the maturity of the security, 
up to an adjustment for convexity. The reason is that investors 
would demand the same expected return on the two securities, 
equal to the quoted yield for the nominal security or to the sum 
of the quoted yield on the TIIS and the expected inflation 
accrual.
As one might expect, this leaves open the issue of 
determining the appropriate nominal security to compare with 
the TIIS. The most common practice is to use a nominal 
coupon security with a similar maturity. However, the two 
securities have different payment flows: the nominal payments 
on the TIIS are much more back-loaded than those on a 
standard nominal coupon security; in real terms, the coupon 
payments on the nominal security decline over time, unlike the 
constant real coupon payments on a TIIS.6 We explicitly take 
this issue into account later when calculating the relative cost of 
TIIS.
One complication with interpreting inflation compensation 
involves the adjustment for convexity. For a given level of the 
yield on a nominal security, uncertainty about future inflation 
increases the expected return on that security. This is a 
mechanical relationship that arises from the convexity of real 
returns in inflation—specifically, because higher inflation 
erodes the real return on the security at a slower rate than lower 
inflation boosts it (see the appendix). This point was originally 
made by Fischer (1975); a more recent description of the 
relationship between inflation compensation and future 
inflation can be found in McCulloch and Kochin (1998).
Although convexity tends to pull down inflation 
compensation relative to expected inflation, there may be an 
inflation risk premium that works in the opposite direction. 
Indeed, investors are most likely not risk-neutral and hence will 
not expect to earn the same return on a TIIS and a nominal 
Treasury security. Because future inflation erodes the real 
payments on a nominal security but not those on a TIIS, one 
might expect risk-averse investors to demand a higher expected 
return on nominal securities when future inflation is uncertain. 
Such a risk premium would push up inflation compensation 
relative to expected inflation, thereby increasing the financing 
cost to the Treasury on nominal debt securities. Indeed, 
eliminating this additional cost was one of the primary 
arguments for issuing TIIS.
Unfortunately, the inflation risk premium is difficult to 
measure, and there is considerable uncertainty about its 
magnitude and even its sign. One estimate comes from 
Campbell and Shiller (1996), who use the historical behavior of 
inflation and real interest rates in a capital asset pricing model 
to estimate the inflation risk premium for the five-year 
nominal bond.7 They estimate the inflation risk premium to be 
between 50 and 100 basis points.
A final consideration in valuing TIIS is that the securities 
offer deflation protection, in the sense that the cumulative 
adjustment to the principal amount of the inflation-indexed 
security at maturity cannot be negative. In terms of real 
returns, this feature gives investors a put option on cumulative 
inflation with a strike of zero. We ignore the value of this 
option in assessing the spread between nominal and inflation-
indexed debt. Over most of our sample, the option was likely 
viewed as being sufficiently out-of-the-money so as to have 
little value.
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and that on a comparable nominal 
security—often called the rate of inflation 
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Chart 1
Treasury Yields and Inflation Compensation
Source: Smoothed yield curves are estimated by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System based on proprietary market quotes 
collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

























3. TIIS Market Developments
The TIIS program got off to an impressive start. The program’s 
inaugural auction of a ten-year note in January 1997 was very 
well received by investors, creating a brief period of enthusiasm 
for the new asset class. The amount of bids at the first auction 
was impressive, with a bid-to-cover ratio (the amount of bids 
divided by the amount issued) equal to 5.3, compared with 
only 2.4 and 1.9 for the preceding and subsequent nominal 
ten-year-note auctions, respectively. Moreover, the stop-out 
rate (the yield at which the security was issued based on 
investor bidding) for the inaugural auction was 3.449 percent, 
which was more than 3 percentage points below the yields on 
comparable nominal Treasury securities.8
The spread between nominal and TIIS yields that prevailed 
over the first several months would in fact be the widest level 
observed during the TIIS program to date. Chart 1 shows the 
history of the yields on nominal and inflation-indexed ten-year 
Treasury securities, where an off-the-run nominal yield is used 
to limit the difference in the liquidity of the nominal and 
indexed securities.9 (Off-the-run securities are previously 
issued securities, which are much less liquid than the most 
recently issued, or on-the-run, securities. The liquidity of off-
the-run securities and TIIS is discussed in more detail below.) 
The chart’s bottom panel shows a measure of ten-year inflation 
compensation based on the difference between the nominal 
and indexed yields. We see that the inflation compensation 
measure averaged about 3 1/4 percent over the first several 
months of 1997, which was greater than the prevailing level of 
inflation expectations from various surveys. In response to the 
favorable valuation of indexed debt, the initial Treasury 
offering was followed by a flurry of other borrowers issuing 
inflation-indexed securities of their own. Between February 
and July 1997, fifteen different U.S. non-Treasury issuers 
offered a total of $2.3 billion of inflation-indexed securities.
The enthusiasm for inflation-indexed debt was not long-
lived, though. Inflation compensation fell steadily over 1997 
(Chart 1), reaching a level of about 2 percent during the first 
half of 1998. This decline may partly reflect the fact that the 
strongest demand for TIIS—by those investors willing to give 
up the largest amount of yield to hold inflation-indexed rather 
than nominal securities—was quickly saturated. In addition, 
the fall in inflation compensation may be partly attributed to a 
broad decline in inflation expectations. In 1997, various 
currency crises abroad and concerns about a global economic 
slowdown, particularly in Asia, dominated market attention. 
As commodity prices plummeted and the dollar surged, 
inflation indicators consistently fell below expectations. 
Chart 2 shows the actual headline CPI figure and the 
unexpected component of the monthly CPI release calculated 
from a Bloomberg survey of market participants. Throughout 
this period, inflation declined to very low levels and 
consistently surprised market participants to the downside. In 
this environment, investors apparently had little interest in 
purchasing the inflation protection offered by TIIS.
In the fall of 1998, financial market volatility abroad spread 
to U.S. financial markets, causing investors to place great value 
on the liquidity of their portfolios. The increased preference for 
liquidity at that time pushed down nominal yields relative to 
TIIS yields, given that nominal securities are more liquid 
(Chart 1). On-the-run nominal Treasury securities were 
viewed as the ultimate liquid instruments, but even off-the-run 
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Chart 2
CPI Inflation and Expectation Errors
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPI); 
Bloomberg (CPI expectations).
Notes: Consumer price index (CPI) inflation is the twelve-month 
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Treasuries benefited, which contributed to the sharp decline in 
their yields. In contrast, yields on TIIS dipped only modestly, as 
trading activity in these securities was reportedly viewed as too 
limited to provide the flexibility needed in such unpredictable 
market conditions. As a result, inflation compensation fell to a 
remarkably low level, reaching a trough at around 1 percent in 
October 1998.
Over the first half of 1999, some of the factors that may have 
been limiting the appeal of TIIS began to unwind. CPI inflation 
turned higher and began to show some upward momentum 
(Chart 2), in part due to considerable increases in energy 
prices. In addition, investors’ preference for liquidity, while 
still elevated, fell back from its extreme levels. In response, 
inflation compensation rose sharply over the first half of 1999.
Since 1999:2, movements in nominal and TIIS yields appear 
to have become more correlated, and inflation compensation 
has remained in a narrower range—typically between 1 1/2 and 
2 1/2 percent—in contrast to the wide swings seen during the 
first two years of the TIIS program. Inflation compensation 
edged higher over most of 1999 as the economy grew at a rapid 
pace and reached a new peak at slightly more than 2 1/2 percent 
in May 2000, when concerns about inflation seemed to crest. 
TIIS yields also rose over this period as the tightening of 
monetary policy led to expectations of a higher path for real 
interest rates.
As the growth of the economy moderated over the latter 
part of 2000, real interest rates and inflation compensation 
drifted lower. Once it became apparent late in 2000 that the 
economy was slowing more rapidly, real interest rates and 
inflation compensation fell considerably, although inflation 
compensation retraced part of that decline after the Federal 
Reserve began to ease monetary policy in early 2001. Inflation 
compensation remained at fairly low levels on average through 
mid-2003, as the recession and the resulting slack in resource 
utilization damped inflation pressures. Real yields also fell 
dramatically, as the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate to 
1 percent. More recently, inflation compensation again turned 
higher as investors became more optimistic about the 
economic outlook.
Additional information about real interest rates can be 
obtained by looking at the term structure of TIIS yields. Chart 3 
presents several snapshots of the TIIS yield curve over the past 
four years. It shows that the curve shifted down somewhat from 
mid-2000 to early 2001, as investors came to expect slower 
economic growth and some easing of monetary policy. 
Realized policy easing through early 2002 was much more 
aggressive than expected, causing the TIIS curve to fall further 
and to steepen dramatically. Indeed, the yield on the TIIS 
maturing in 2002 declined all the way to, and even below, 
zero.10 TIIS yields generally continued to move lower in 2003, 
as the economic recovery turned out to be more anemic than 
expected, although by the end of the sample they had risen off 
their lows reached earlier in the year.
The spread between nominal and TIIS 
yields that prevailed over the first several 
months would in fact be the widest level 
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Chart 4




















Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional 
Forecasters.
Note: The survey measure is expected ten-year consumer price index 
inflation.
4. The Low Relative Valuation of TIIS
Although recent trends in TIIS and nominal Treasury yields 
seem reasonable given the changes in macroeconomic 
conditions that have taken place, the level of TIIS yields relative 
to nominal yields has been somewhat puzzling. In particular, 
the yields on TIIS have been quite high relative to nominal 
Treasury yields, so that the level of inflation compensation has 
consistently fallen below many survey measures of expected 
inflation. Chart 4 again shows the ten-year inflation compen-
sation measure plotted with a measure of ten-year inflation 
expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. On 
average, market-based inflation compensation has been about 
50 basis points below the median survey response. This average 
difference is only slightly smaller (45 basis points) if we focus 
only on the period since early 1999, when inflation 
compensation seemed to stabilize somewhat. Even more 
striking, the level of inflation compensation has often fallen 
around or below the responses of 90 percent of the survey 
participants.11
One consideration is whether the difference between 
inflation compensation and the survey measure can be 
explained by the convexity adjustment described earlier. This 
adjustment is likely not large enough to account for the 
difference. Under a reasonable estimate of uncertainty about 
future inflation (discussed in Section 5), the convexity effect 
decreases ten-year inflation compensation by 11 basis points or 
less—a small portion of the average 50-basis-point gap 
between inflation compensation and the survey.
The findings from Chart 4 suggest either that some special 
factors weighed on TIIS prices, or that investors had very low 
perceptions of future inflation and the associated risks. We 
now consider some of these possible interpretations.
4.1 Difficulty Adjusting to a New Asset Class
The low valuations of TIIS may, in part, reflect the difficulties 
associated with launching a new type of asset. The securities are 
somewhat complex and likely require a nontrivial investment 
in a potential buyer’s infrastructure (such as accounting and 
trading systems), thereby hindering the expansion of the 
investor base. Furthermore, investors have had only a relatively 
short track record of evaluating the behavior of these securities, 
including the likely volatility of TIIS prices and their 
correlations with other asset prices. Given these considerations, 
one might expect it to take some time to build a sizable investor 
base for the TIIS market.
Data on the distribution of end users of TIIS are not 
available, but anecdotal reports suggest that the investor base 
for these securities has been much more concentrated than the 
base for nominal Treasuries. As expected, the primary 
participants in the market are large institutional investors such 
as pension funds and insurance companies—investors with 
significant amounts of long-term real liabilities that can be 
counterbalanced by holding long-term real assets.
Notably, the primary dealers, which are the major 
participants in the market for nominal Treasury securities, 
have generally been much less active in the TIIS market than 
they are in the nominal Treasury market. For the dealer activity 
present in the TIIS market, trading volume is concentrated 
among a small number of dealers. The share of total TIIS 
transaction volume among the top quintile of primary dealers 
averaged 80 percent in 2002, compared with 47 percent for 
nominal Treasury securities.
Importantly, however, investor interest in the TIIS market 
appears to have expanded significantly in the past couple of 
years. Large numbers of investors reportedly have entered the 
market, particularly after the Treasury reaffirmed its 
commitment to the TIIS program in February 2002 and 
indicated that it would seek ways to develop the market 
further.12 Indeed, dealers report that their customer base has 
been expanding robustly, particularly among medium-sized 
institutional investors. Moreover, anecdotal reports suggest 
that several dealers began to increase their market-making 
activity in the TIIS market in late 2002 and 2003. 
In addition, small investors appear to be increasing their 
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Chart 5
Trading Turnover of Treasury Inflation-Indexed 
Securities 
Weekly Trading Volume Relative to Outstanding Debt
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (trading volume); 
U.S. Treasury Department (outstanding amounts).
Notes: The series shown are thirteen-week moving averages. 
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offer mutual funds that hold inflation-indexed securities. The 
most recent data available from these funds indicate that the 
funds have a total of approximately $16 billion in assets. These 
holdings still represent only a modest portion of outstanding 
TIIS, but the funds are growing rapidly. In fact, the total 
amount of assets in the funds appears to have expanded five-
fold since 2001.
Overall, the “newness” of TIIS was probably an important 
factor weighing on the valuations of the securities over the 
earlier parts of our study period. The fact that the breadth of 
investor participation in the market has continued to increase 
even recently suggests that it has taken some market partici-
pants quite a long time to incorporate TIIS into their 
investment strategies. At this point, however, any lingering 
effect of this adjustment process on the valuation of TIIS has 
probably diminished substantially. TIIS have now traded in the 
market for more than seven years, giving potential investors 
enough experience to understand and adjust to the asset class. 
4.2 Lower Liquidity of TIIS
Another factor that may have weighed on the value of TIIS is 
their lower liquidity relative to that of nominal Treasury debt.13 
As we observed, primary dealers are generally much less active 
in the TIIS market than they are in the nominal Treasury 
market. The inactivity of the primary dealers largely reflects the 
fact that TIIS do not play the same role as hedging and trading 
vehicles that nominal Treasuries do, in part because of the 
absence of private inflation-indexed debt that needs to be 
hedged. As a result, dealer positions in TIIS pale in comparison 
to those in nominal securities. Over 2002, for example, primary 
dealers in total had an average of $102 billion in long positions 
in nominal Treasury coupon securities and $164 billion in 
short positions. By comparison, those same dealers had on 
average only $7 billion in long positions in TIIS and $4 billion 
in short positions.
Instead, activity in the TIIS market is dominated by end 
users that might find the securities appealing as an investment 
vehicle (a buy-and-hold asset). This characteristic can be seen 
from Chart 5, which shows weekly trading volume in TIIS 
reported by primary dealers as a percentage of total 
outstanding TIIS (the turnover rate). Most of the trading in the 
TIIS market takes place between dealers and customers. 
Further evidence of the greater appeal of TIIS to institutional 
investors than to primary dealers is available from the awards 
at Treasury auctions. Over 2001 and 2002, an average of 
77.5 percent of the awards of nominal ten-year Treasury notes 
went to primary dealers and only 8.2 percent went directly to 
institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies. By contrast, 54.7 percent of the 
awards at ten-year TIIS auctions went to primary dealers while 
30.5 percent went to institutional investors.14
Given these differences in the composition of market 
participants and in the nature of trading activity, the liquidity 
of TIIS will likely never rival that of on-the-run nominal 
Treasury securities. Nevertheless, anecdotal reports suggest 
that TIIS liquidity has improved much in recent years and is 
currently not far below that of off-the-run nominal Treasuries.
These anecdotal reports are corroborated by the trading 
volumes depicted in Chart 5. As is evident, trading activity 
increased significantly over this period, with the weekly 
turnover rate reaching an average of about 11 percent over the 
first three quarters of 2003, compared with an average of less 
than 6 percent in 1999. In dollar terms, trading volume 
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increased even faster, given that the supply of TIIS was 
expanding robustly over this period. This improvement has 
largely coincided with the greater participation of investors and 
dealers in the TIIS market.
The 11 percent turnover rate for TIIS is not far below the 
rate for some other types of fixed-income assets. Indeed, the 
average weekly turnover rate for agency debt securities over the 
same period was roughly 17 percent; for mortgage-backed 
securities, it was about 21 percent. Trading volume in nominal 
Treasury securities was instead much higher over that period, 
with an average weekly turnover rate of 82 percent across all 
outstanding coupon securities. It is important to note, though, 
that most of this trading took place in on-the-run issues, which 
turned over more than fourteen times per week on average and 
accounted for 74 percent of the total volume in Treasury 
coupon securities. Excluding on-the-run issues, we note that 
the turnover rate for all off-the-run Treasury coupon securities 
was approximately 22 percent—much closer to, although still 
above, the turnover rate for TIIS.
TIIS also appear to be somewhat less liquid than off-the-run 
nominal Treasury securities when liquidity is measured by 
transaction costs. Table 1 summarizes indicative bid-ask 
spreads observed for TIIS and for nominal Treasury securities. 
Bid-ask spreads on on-the-run nominal Treasuries are shown 
to be the narrowest, reflecting the remarkable liquidity of those 
issues. The spreads on TIIS are closer to those on off-the-run 
nominal securities, although the TIIS spreads are still wider. 
Moreover, the market for nominal Treasuries appears to be 
deeper than the TIIS market, in the sense that a larger volume 
of securities can be traded at posted bid and ask prices.15
Overall, TIIS appear to be somewhat less liquid than off-the-
run nominal securities—a factor that could boost TIIS yields 
and reduce measured inflation compensation. However, at 
least in recent years, the difference in liquidity has been 
sufficiently limited that, judging from observed liquidity 
premia in other markets, the difference would have had a fairly 
modest effect on the relative valuations of nominal and indexed 
securities.16
4.3 Relative Supply 
From March 1997 through March 2002, the Treasury on net 
paid down $688 billion of nominal Treasury coupon securities, 
or 26 percent of the outstanding stock. In contrast, the supply 
of TIIS increased from zero at the beginning of 1997 to more 
than $145 billion (including inflation accrual) by March 2002. 
The divergent trends for supply may have affected the relative 
pricing of these securities. Indeed, the transition to a smaller 
nominal Treasury market at times seemed to result in a 
heightened premium for nominal Treasuries relative to other 
fixed-income securities.
However, the paydown of Treasury debt has reversed in 
recent years, and the Treasury has been forced to implement 
sizable increases in its issuance of nominal securities. Indeed, it 
issued $96 billion in nominal ten-year Treasury notes over 
2003—an amount well above the $47 billion of gross issuance 
in 1997. By comparison, gross issuance of ten-year TIIS 
increased less dramatically over that period, from $15 billion to 
$26 billion (and gross issuance of all TIIS has actually fallen 
over this period). Thus, while supply considerations at times 
may have weighed on the valuation of TIIS relative to nominal 
Treasury securities, any such effects have likely weakened 
substantially in recent years.
Table 1




Five Years or 
Less
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On-the-run nominal 1/4 to 1/2 1/2 NA
Off-the-run nominal 1/2 to 1 1/2 to 1 2
Inflation-indexed 1 to 2 2 4 to 16
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (informal survey of dealers 
conducted in mid-2003).
Notes: Bid-ask spreads are measured in 1/32s of a point, where a point 
roughly equals 1 percent of the security’s par value. Spreads are for trades 
of approximately $25 million for Treasury inflation-indexed securities 
and up to $100 million for nominal Treasuries. 
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Chart 6
Inflation Compensation Measures
Source: Smoothed yield curves are estimated by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System based on proprietary market quotes 
collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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4.4 What Is the Total Effect of These Factors?
In general, the three factors we described—the difficulty 
adjusting to a new asset class, the lower liquidity of TIIS relative 
to nominal Treasury securities, and changes in the relative 
supply—may have weighed on the relative values of TIIS over 
the earlier parts of the period examined. However, those effects 
have probably weakened substantially in recent years. It there-
fore may be informative to focus on changes over time in the 
valuation of TIIS relative to nominal Treasury securities.
One difficulty in conducting such an exercise, however, 
arises because the economy weakened in the latter part of the 
study period, resulting in a decline in near-term inflationary 
pressures that presumably pulled down inflation compen-
sation. This cyclical influence would likely have the largest 
effect on inflation expectations over the next several years and 
would fade at longer horizons. In contrast, the three factors 
considered above would likely be felt at all maturities, given 
that they influence the demand for all TIIS. Thus, one way to 
remove some of the cyclical effect and focus on the influence of 
these factors is to look at a forward rate of inflation 
compensation.
More specifically, the ten-year inflation compensation 
measure depicted in our charts can be decomposed into the 
rate of inflation compensation over the next five years and the 
forward rate of inflation compensation from five to ten years 
ahead.17 (The average of these two rates will approximately 
equal the ten-year measure.) These measures are shown in 
Chart 6 for the period since 1999, which is as far back as the 
measures are computed.18 As expected, the five-year measure 
fell to fairly low levels over the past few years, which in turn 
held down ten-year inflation compensation. However, the 
forward rate of inflation compensation from five to ten years 
ahead generally trended up over the period, despite the 
weakening economy.
The rising pattern of the forward inflation compensation 
rate provides some tentative evidence of an improvement in 
the relative valuation of TIIS over time that might be associated 
with some unwinding of the three factors discussed above. 
However, this evidence must be viewed with some caution. 
As one might expect, the forward rate is a very crude measure 
of the influence of these factors, as it is also influenced by 
changes to long-run inflation expectations and the inflation 
risk premium.
Overall, the total magnitude of the influence of these factors 
is difficult to quantify. The upward trend in forward inflation 
compensation appears to be on the order of 50 basis points or 
more, suggesting that these factors were having a fairly sizable 
effect earlier in the period.19 It also seems likely that the effects 
of these factors had largely disappeared by the end of the 
sample. Indeed, our discussion suggests that the influence of 
the newness of TIIS and supply trends should have largely 
unwound and that the premium associated with remaining 
liquidity differences between TIIS and off-the-run nominal 
Treasuries should be relatively small.
4.5 A Benign View of Inflation 
and Associated Risks
Even assuming that the three factors we identified depressed 
inflation compensation by 50 basis points on average over the 
period since 1999, their effects would just offset the average gap 
between the ten-year inflation compensation measure and 
survey expectations (see Chart 4). As we discussed, based on 
Campbell and Shiller’s analysis (1996), one might expect the 
inflation risk premium to be between 50 and 100 basis points.20 
For these factors to be consistent with that hypothesis, they 
would have required a much larger effect—between 100 and 
150 basis points—which we view as implausibly large. Thus, we 
are left to conclude that the low level of inflation compensation 
observed over this period to a large extent reflects investors’ 
very benign outlook for inflation and the associated risks of 
holding nominal securities.21
5. The Cost of TIIS to the Treasury
The seemingly low valuation of TIIS relative to nominal debt 
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those securities to the Treasury. We now provide estimates of 
the cost of issuing the outstanding TIIS relative to the cost 
incurred by the Treasury had it instead issued nominal 
securities.
While the previous analysis compared TIIS yields with yields 
on off-the-run nominal securities, the relevant comparison 
from the perspective of financing costs is between TIIS and on-
the-run nominal issues. The Treasury benefits from a liquidity 
premium that tends to lower the yields on its on-the-run 
nominal issues. This liquidity premium thus provides a cost 
advantage to nominal debt relative to TIIS.
The difficulty in obtaining cost estimates occurs in 
specifying the counterfactual, or the issuance strategy that the 
Treasury would have followed in the absence of TIIS. Because 
the payment flows on nominal and inflation-indexed securities 
differ considerably, there is no obvious choice of a nominal 
security for comparison to the TIIS. One might be tempted to 
compare TIIS with nominal debt securities having the same 
maturity, but the nominal coupon security has declining real 
coupon payments that give it a shorter duration than the TIIS. 
To minimize the effect of differences in payments, we instead 
compare the cost of each outstanding TIIS with the cost of a 
portfolio of hypothetical on-the-run zero-coupon nominal 
securities that replicate the back-loaded payments on the 
TIIS.22 To be sure, the Treasury would not follow such a 
strategy in the absence of TIIS, but would instead likely increase 
its issuance of a variety of on-the-run securities. Nevertheless, 
this approach effectively captures the cost of replacing issuance 
of TIIS with issuance of nominal on-the-run securities, while 
minimizing any effects arising from differences in their 
payment streams.23
The first step in our analysis is to calculate break-even 
inflation rates for each TIIS auction, or the rate of inflation at 
which the cost to the Treasury of issuing a TIIS will exactly 
equal the cost of raising the same amount of funds by issuing 
the comparable nominal security (the portfolio of zero-coupon 
securities).24 If inflation exceeds the break-even rate, the TIIS 
will be more costly than the nominal security, and vice versa. 
(The break-even inflation rate is the same concept as the 
inflation compensation rate discussed earlier, but here it is 
measured relative to on-the-run nominal securities rather than 
off-the-run securities.)
The break-even inflation rates for all auctions (including 
reopenings) of TIIS to date are shown in Table 2, column 5. 
The highest break-even inflation rates are for the first two 
auctions of inflation-indexed securities (both of which are the 
ten-year note maturing in 2007). As we observed, this result 
could reflect the fact that investors with the strongest demand 
for inflation protection were among the first to purchase TIIS. 
The lowest break-even inflation rates are for those securities 
issued around the financial market turbulence in the fall of 
1998, perhaps because of the heightened preference for 
liquidity at that time. For auctions since April 1999, break-even 
inflation rates have remained in a narrower range, between 
1.48 and 2.36 percent.
The cost of each TIIS issue to date depends on the difference 
between actual inflation and the break-even inflation rate. 
Column 6 of Table 2 shows the inflation rate realized over the 
period since each auction, adjusted for the indexation lag and 
expressed on an annualized basis. Deviations of actual inflation 
from the break-even inflation rate generate a stream of 
differences in payments on the nominal and inflation-indexed 
securities over the maturity of those issues. In our compu-
tations, we express the relative cost of the TIIS as the present 
value of all past and future differences in the payments on the 
two securities.25
Column 7 presents this cost measure for each outstanding 
TIIS as of June 30, 2003, based on realized inflation through 
that date. As we see, the largest cost savings to the Treasury 
occurred at the first two TIIS auctions, which together saved 
the Treasury more than $1 billion. By contrast, the TIIS issued 
at all auctions since October 1997 have been more expensive 
than comparable nominal securities.26 The relative cost is 
especially high for those securities issued in October 1998 and 
January 1999. Summing across all securities, we estimate that 
the excess cost of all outstanding TIIS based on inflation to date 
is just under $3 billion.27
While these calculations account only for realized inflation 
to date, it may also be useful to estimate the total cost of the 
program under an assumption about inflation going forward. 
We find that future inflation would have to come in at about 
1.7 percent for the Treasury to make up its realized costs to date 
and to break even on outstanding TIIS (in present-value 
terms). Of course, most economic forecasts project that CPI 
inflation will come in well above this level. For example, the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters discussed earlier expects 
inflation to be around 2.5 percent in the long run. In that case, 
it appears that the Treasury will pay nearly 80 basis points of 
additional yield on TIIS than it would have paid on comparable 
nominal debt.
The seemingly low valuation of TIIS 
relative to nominal debt securities has 
important implications for the relative cost 
of those securities to the Treasury. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2004 57
Under the assumption that inflation will edge up to 
2.5 percent by 2005 and remain at that level thereafter, we can 
compute the total cost of the TIIS program, or the present value 
of the differences in all past and future payments on the 
securities.28 The results in Table 2, column 8, indicate that the 
Treasury will incur a higher relative cost on all but the first 
three TIIS auctions. The total cost of the inflation-indexed 
securities outstanding is estimated to be about $12 billion 
under the assumed path of inflation.
We obtain similar results if we instead consider an 
alternative exercise in which the Treasury follows a dynamic 
strategy for issuing coupon-bearing nominal securities. 
The basic insight of this approach is that the accrual of inflation 
compensation on indexed debt is similar to the issuance of 
additional debt, in the sense that it increases the principal and 
all future coupon payments. In fact, the Treasury can employ a 
strategy in which it issues the nominal coupon security with the 
same maturity date as the TIIS every six months so as to 
replicate all of the payments of the indexed security up to its 
maturity date. The relative cost of nominal and indexed debt is 
then captured entirely by the single difference in the payments 
on the maturity date. Under this approach, the estimated cost 
of outstanding TIIS (not shown) is very close to the cost found 
in Table 2.29
Table 2


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 1/29/1997 1/15/2007 3 3/8 7.0 3.20 2.33 -586 -838
2 4/8/1997 1/15/2007 3 3/8 8.0 3.26 2.33 -697 -1,005
3 7/9/1997 7/15/2002 3 5/8 8.0 2.40 2.34a -38 -38
4 10/8/1997 7/15/2002 3 5/8 8.0 2.34 2.39a 23 23
5 1/8/1998 1/15/2008 3 5/8 8.0 1.75 2.40 381 668
6 4/8/1998 4/15/2028 3 5/8 8.0 2.17 2.49 185 740
7 7/8/1998 4/15/2028 3 5/8 8.0 1.93 2.50 307 1,281
8 10/7/1998 1/15/2008 3 5/8 8.0 0.69 2.55 894 1,632
9 1/6/1999 1/15/2009 3 7/8 8.0 0.83 2.59 810 1,632
10 4/7/1999 4/15/2029 3 7/8 7.0 1.59 2.69 427 1,820
11 7/7/1999 1/15/2009 3 7/8 7.0 1.87 2.58 271 526
12 10/6/1999 4/15/2029 3 7/8 7.0 1.94 2.64 253 1,119
13 1/12/2000 1/15/2010 4 1/4 6.0 2.36 2.60 73 107
14 7/12/2000 1/15/2010 4 1/4 5.0 2.03 2.43 82 236
15 10/11/2000 4/15/2029 3 7/8 5.0 1.83 2.35 92 833
16 1/10/2001 1/15/2011 3 1/2 6.0 1.58 2.25 121 544
17 7/11/2001 1/15/2011 3 1/2 5.0 1.80 1.87 6 269
18 10/10/2001 4/15/2032 3 3/8 5.0 1.98 2.07 7 568
19 1/9/2002 1/15/2012 3 3/8 6.0 1.67 2.41 75 493
20 7/10/2002 7/15/2012 3 9.0 1.79 2.33 52 591
21 10/9/2002 7/15/2012 3 7.0 1.48 2.71 66 681
22 1/8/2003 7/15/2012 3 6.0 1.69 3.08 41 456
Total 2,846 12,337
Sources: U.S. Treasury Department (columns 1-4); authors’ calculations (columns 5-8).
Notes: Columns 7 and 8 are the amount by which the cost of TIIS exceeds the cost of comparable nominal securities, where the cost is measured by the present 
value of the differences in the payments on the TIIS and the nominal securities. All cost figures are measured as of June 30, 2003. Column 7 shows the cost 
based on inflation through that date, accounting for the indexation lag. Column 8 presents the total cost if future inflation follows the path assumed by
Congressional Budget Office (2003). Par amounts issued exclude securities issued to the Federal Reserve.
aActual inflation for the July 15, 2002, security is measured only through its maturity date.58 Treasury Inflation-Indexed Debt
Although the above calculations suggest that TIIS appear to 
have been an expensive form of borrowing for the Treasury in 
expected terms, the actual (ex-post) cost of TIIS will depend on 
the realized level of CPI inflation over the life of those issues. 
Given the difficulties involved in making long-run economic 
forecasts, realized inflation can deviate substantially from 
expected inflation. If inflation was to come in above expec-
tations, the ex-post cost of TIIS would be higher than these 
estimates. Conversely, if inflation was to come in far enough 
below the expectations assumed above, the outstanding TIIS 
could result in a lower financing cost than the cost of nominal 
debt. We estimate that each 0.01 percentage point of additional 
inflation adds about $150 million to the total cost of the TIIS 
program.
It is difficult to calibrate the uncertainty involved in 
predicting long-run inflation. A reasonable estimate, based on 
simulations of the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model and the 
past prediction errors reported by the Congressional Budget 
Office, is that the standard deviation of annualized ten-year 
inflation is somewhere between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage 
points.30 If the average level of inflation in the long run is 
around 2.5 percent, as assumed above, then this range of 
uncertainty suggests that the probability of breaking even on 
outstanding TIIS is approximately between one-sixth and one-
third. Of course, the probability of breaking even would 
increase if the average level of inflation is below 2.5 percent.
6. Conclusion
Over the first seven years of its existence, Treasury inflation-
indexed debt has not appeared to be a less expensive form of 
financing for the Treasury. To some extent, the high relative 
cost of these securities to date may reflect the difficulties 
associated with launching a new type of asset, the lower 
liquidity of indexed debt relative to nominal Treasury 
securities, and the considerable growth in the supply of indexed 
debt. Furthermore, we argue that TIIS investors over the period 
appear to have had a very benign outlook for inflation and the 
associated risks of holding nominal securities.
In recent years, however, some of the factors that may have 
weighed on the relative value of TIIS have likely weakened. By 
now, investors have had ample time to adjust to the new 
security, and investor participation in the TIIS market has 
expanded considerably; liquidity appears to have improved 
noticeably with the increased market participation; and supply 
trends have become less favorable for nominal Treasury 
securities. Perhaps for these reasons, there is some tentative 
evidence that the relative valuation of TIIS has improved in 
recent years, although additional time and data will be needed 
for that conclusion to become more decisive.
Although the TIIS program thus far has appeared to be 
expensive, the Treasury has indicated its intention to sustain its 
issuance of indexed debt and to encourage the development of 
the market. In general, the Treasury pursues a more 
complicated debt management strategy than simply 
minimizing its current financing costs.31 For example, the 
Treasury currently issues securities with maturities out to ten 
years, even though it pays a larger term premium at the margin 
on the longer maturities than it does on short-term debt. 
Instead, the Treasury likely takes into account the relationship 
between its borrowing needs and the costs of issuing different 
types of debt over time. Indeed, tax revenues might tend to 
increase with inflation, in which case the Treasury may be 
better able to absorb inflation risk than investors. Given these 
considerations, the optimal debt structure for the Treasury 
could contain some indexed debt.32
In addition, the Treasury likely recognizes that the TIIS 
market is still evolving and that the ultimate borrowing costs 
associated with these securities relative to nominal Treasury 
securities remain very uncertain. The behavior of the TIIS 
market going forward will therefore be of considerable 
interest.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2004 59
As we describe in Section 2, the payments on Treasury 
inflation-indexed securities (TIIS) increase in line with the 
consumer price index (CPI). Specifically, the value of the 
principal on a given day is scaled up by an index ratio 
determined by dividing the reference CPI for that day by the 
reference CPI at the time of issuance. The reference CPI on the 
first of the month is the nonseasonally adjusted CPI index 
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the third 
preceding calendar month, and its value within the month is 
determined by linear interpolation. This is the minimum 
indexation lag possible given the timing of the CPI data release.
Because of this indexation, the nominal payments on the 
indexed security are back-loaded relative to those on a nominal 
security, assuming that the rate of inflation is positive. An 
indexed security issued at time t with a coupon rate of c, a 
maturity of N years, and a par value of $100 has coupon 
payments after n years of  , where   is the 
reference CPI at time t+n, and a principal payment after N 
years of  . (For notational simplicity, we assume 
that coupons are paid annually and ignore semiannual 
compounding.) This back-loaded pattern allows the real 
coupon payments,  , to be constant. 
If future inflation were known, the price of the inflation-
indexed security at time t, Bt , would be determined by the sum 
of future nominal payments multiplied by the value of those 
payments, as follows:
(A1)          
                      ,
where   is the discount function, which equals the value at 
time t that investors place on a nominal payment n periods into 
the future.33 The discount function is determined by the term 
structure of nominal interest rates  , where 
 is the n-period zero-coupon nominal interest rate at time t. 
Rewriting the index ratio   as  , where   is the 
average annualized rate of inflation over the next n periods, and 
writing out the discount function, equation A1 becomes
(A2)       .
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To derive a simpler equation for TIIS, we define the n-period 
zero-coupon real interest rate   by the following:34
(A3)                          .
Using this definition, equation A2 becomes
(A4)                ,
which states that the TIIS is valued like a regular bond with a 
fixed coupon of c, only discounted using real interest rates 
rather than nominal rates. Note that the real payments on the 
TIIS security are independent of inflation, so that equation A3 
holds regardless of whether future inflation is known. In 
practice, the quoted yield on a TIIS is the real yield to maturity 
on the security, which is the constant real interest rate
(  for all n) for which equation A4 holds.
The spread between the yield on a TIIS and the yield on a 
comparable nominal security will reflect investors’ views about 
future inflation. If future inflation is known, the N-period 
returns on two investments—one making a real payment in N 
periods and one making a nominal payment—must be equal, 
which implies that
(A5)                         .
(We drop the subscripts and superscripts for notational 
simplicity.) This equation will be approximately satisfied if 
. Thus, in this case, the yield spread between 
comparable nominal and indexed zero-coupon securities 
should (approximately) equal the future rate of inflation.
Equation A5 would hold for zero-coupon yields, and hence 
for the valuation of all the individual payments on the TIIS. 
The relationship is more complicated for the yields to maturity 
on coupon-bearing bonds. For those securities, the choice of 
the appropriate nominal security to compare with the TIIS is 
not obvious. The most common practice is to use a nominal 
coupon security with the same maturity as the TIIS. However, 
those two securities have different payment flows: the nominal 
payments on the TIIS are much more back-loaded than those 
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coupon payments on the nominal security decline over time, 
unlike the constant real coupon payments on a TIIS. 
Sack (2000) instead derives a measure of inflation 
compensation based on a portfolio of nominal zero-coupon 
securities (read off an estimated yield curve) constructed to 
match the back-loaded payments of the TIIS. Under the 
additional assumption that inflation is expected to be relatively 
stable around some level  , the following relationship still 
holds:
(A6)                         ,
where   is the nominal yield that investors would demand 
on a security with the same back-loaded payment stream as the 
TIIS. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the Sack paper, the 
resulting measure differs only modestly from a simple yield 
spread based on a nominal coupon security. Sack argues that a 
more important factor is choosing a nominal security with a 
level of liquidity comparable to that of the TIIS—as we do here 
by using off-the-run rather than on-the-run nominal 
securities.
One complication with interpreting inflation compensation 
measures involves uncertainty about future inflation. If 
investors are risk-neutral, then they will demand the same 
expected real return on nominal and inflation-indexed zero-
coupon securities. In that case, equation A5 becomes:
(A7)                    ,
which can be rewritten approximately as follows:
(A8)                   .
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According to equation A8, inflation uncertainty tends to pull 
inflation compensation down relative to the expected rate of 
inflation. To see that, note that Jensen’s inequality implies that
(A9)                     .
As a result, the yield spread will be less than the expected rate of 
inflation,
(A10)                                ,
by an amount that increases with the uncertainty surrounding 
future inflation. For a coupon-bearing security, the total effect 
is a bit more complicated—equation A8 shows the effect of 
uncertainty on the value of any single payment, and those 
effects have to be aggregated across all payments on the 
security.
While convexity tends to pull down inflation compensation 
relative to expected inflation, there may be an inflation risk 
premium that works in the opposite direction. If investors are 
not risk-neutral, they will generally not demand the same 
expected return on the two securities. Because future inflation 
erodes the real payments on a nominal security but not on a 
TIIS, one might expect investors to demand a higher expected 
return on nominal securities when future inflation is uncertain. 
Such a risk premium would push the yield spread   up 
relative to expected inflation, thereby increasing the financing 
cost to the Treasury on nominal debt securities. Indeed, as we  
observe in this article, this was one of the primary arguments 
for issuing Treasury inflation-indexed securities.
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1. Investors cannot precisely lock in a real return because of taxes 
and the indexation lag on TIIS.
2. Another argument for issuing inflation-indexed debt is that it 
might help commit the government to maintaining low inflation. 
However, this incentive mechanism is generally seen as less important 
at this time for the United States.
3. For a broad overview of the Treasury securities market, see Dupont 
and Sack (1999).
4.  In part for this reason, in May 2001, the Treasury Advisory 
Committee of the Bond Market Association recommended that the 
Treasury discontinue issuance of inflation-indexed securities (see 
“Report to the Secretary of the Treasury from the Treasury Advisory 
Committee of the Bond Market Association,” May 1, 2001, available at 
<http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/
adv-com/reports/index.html>).
5. The yield to maturity on a TIIS is calculated from the standard bond 
pricing formula, only assuming that there will be no additional 
inflation accrual from the quote date forward.
6. Sack (2000) instead derives a measure of inflation compensation 
based on a portfolio of nominal zero-coupon securities (read off an 
estimated yield curve) constructed to match the back-loaded 
payments of the TIIS. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in that paper, the 
resulting measure differs only modestly from a simple yield spread 
based on a nominal coupon security.
7. Similarly, Kopcke and Kimball (1999) evaluate the role of TIIS in 
efficient investor portfolios.
8. The behavior of TIIS over the first several months following the 
first auction is described in more detail in Wilcox (1998).
9. The indexed yield shown is the yield on the most recently issued 
ten-year TIIS, with a small adjustment made to keep its maturity fixed 
at ten years (see endnote 18). The nominal yield shown is the ten-year 
par yield read from a smoothed nominal yield curve estimated using 
the Svensson method to fit outstanding off-the-run notes and bonds. 
10.  Note that there is no zero bound on the yield on TIIS, as there is 
on the yields on nominal securities, because the inflation compen-
sation can result in a positive nominal return even when the real yield 
is negative. The yield on the 2002 TIIS fell well below zero after the 
date shown.
11. An alternative measure, the Michigan Survey Research Center’s 
Survey of Households, asks about the expected level of inflation over 
the next five to ten years. On average, the median response has been 
about 32 basis points above the Philadelphia Fed survey, thus 
increasing the discrepancy with inflation compensation.
12.  See the Treasury’s February 2002 Quarterly Refunding Statement 
(available at <http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-
management/remarks/index.html>) and the comments by Brian 
Roseboro, the Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets.
13.  The effect of liquidity on the relative valuation of TIIS is discussed 
in Shen and Corning (2001).
14.  Some of the bidding by primary dealers is intended to cover short 
positions that they have established by selling the security in the when-
issued market. Thus, a portion of their auction awards is essentially 
passed on to other investors.
15. In 2003:1, TIIS were also added to TradeWeb, an electronic 
trading platform widely used by large institutional investors. This 
addition likely lowered transaction costs for those investors.
16. For example, Lonstaff (2002) calculates that liquidity premia on 
Refcorp zero-coupon securities relative to Treasury zero-coupon 
securities are roughly 10 to 15 basis points. The difference in liquidity 
between those securities is presumably greater than the difference in 
liquidity between TIIS and off-the-run nominal securities.
17. We compute a five-year real rate and a forward real rate five to ten 
years ahead by smoothing a yield curve through outstanding TIIS. The 
TIIS yield curve is estimated using the Nelson-Siegel method, and 
securities with maturities of around five and ten years are given 
additional weight to force the curve to fit well at those horizons. We 
then compare these measures with their counterparts from the 
smoothed nominal Treasury yield curve to obtain the two inflation 
compensation measures.
18. It is difficult to estimate a TIIS yield curve before 1999, given the 
limited number of securities outstanding. In fact, the measures 
presented are probably better estimated over the period since 2001, 
when the maturities of outstanding securities have been closer to the 
five-year maturity range.
19. The forward rate seems to have increased from a typical level of 
around 2 1/2 percent from 1999 to 2001 to about 3 percent in recent 
months. The forward rate was even lower than 2 1/2 percent in early 62 Treasury Inflation-Indexed Debt 
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Note 19 continued
1999—when investors may have still placed a very high premium on 
liquidity—and in 2000 and early 2001, when nominal Treasuries may 
have commanded a scarcity premium.
20. The authors’ estimate was for a five-year nominal Treasury 
security. It is not clear how to extend this estimate to a ten-year 
security, although many market participants believe that the long end 
of the yield curve is the most sensitive to inflation expectations.
21. It is difficult to parse the rate of inflation compensation into its two 
components—expected inflation and the inflation risk premium. If 
one takes the survey measure as expected inflation, then the inflation 
risk premium would have been near zero. If one believes that expected 
inflation was lower than the survey measure, then the inflation risk 
premium would have been positive but small.
22. We do not consider the fact that the yields on nominal securities 
might have been higher if the Treasury had issued them in place of 
TIIS. However, it is unlikely that this consideration would fully offset 
the magnitude of the cost difference, which is estimated below to be 
around 80 basis points.
23. The values of the hypothetical zero-coupon securities are derived 
from the constant-maturity yield curve estimated by the Treasury, 
which is based primarily on the yields of on-the-run securities. We 
thank the Treasury for providing the zero-coupon data for the 
relevant dates. One concern is that this yield curve may be poorly 
estimated because of the limited number of data points.
24. This is strictly true only if inflation is constant over the maturity of 
the security. Allowing for a time-varying path of inflation would 
require additional assumptions.
25. This method discounts future payment differences and com-
pounds past payment differences using our estimated off-the-run 
yield curve.
26. Interestingly, the Treasury roughly broke even on the only TIIS to 
have matured—the July 2002 note. As can be seen, it saved $38 million 
from its first auction of the issue but paid an extra $23 million on the 
reopening, leaving a net saving of $15 million.
27. One consideration that we ignore is that the Treasury recovers 
some of the additional interest it pays in the form of taxation on 
interest income.
28. More specifically, we assume that inflation follows the path 
assumed in Congressional Budget Office (2003), extrapolating the 
2.5 percent level beyond the projection horizon in that report.
29. See the July 2002 working paper version of this article (available 
at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200232/
200232pap.pdf>) for more details on this approach and a comparison 
of the results to the static issuance strategy described here.
30. See the July 2002 working paper version of this article (available 
at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200232/
200232pap.pdf>) for estimates underlying this range. The FRB/US 
model is described in Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999).
31. In a speech delivered on March 14, 2002, Under Secretary of the 
Treasury Peter Fisher stated that the objective of debt managers is to 
“meet the financing needs of the federal government at the lowest cost 
over time.” This objective could allow for issuance of securities that 
are currently more costly if doing so would lower future borrowing 
costs.
32. The academic literature on optimal debt structure focuses on the 
objective of smoothing tax rates, which in some cases argues for 
issuing debt with stable real payments. See Barro (1997) and Bohn 
(1990) for a discussion. 
33. We scale the security to produce an index ratio of 1 at time t. 
Otherwise, all payments would be scaled up by  , where   is the 
reference CPI at the time of issuance. We also assume that the first 
coupon payment is exactly one period away. Otherwise, equation A1 
would represent the “dirty” price of the security, which we would have 
to adjust for accrued interest and inflation compensation to arrive at 
the quoted (“clean”) price.
34. Note that this equation implicitly defines a real discount function 
.
Pt Pi ⁄ P i
δ
r n () δ n () 1 π
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